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ARTICLES
HELLO DARKNESS: INVOLUNTARY
TESTIMONY AND SILENCE AS EVIDENCE
IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
DANIEL KANSTROOM*
At 6:30 a.m., on Friday, October 21, 1988, some forty agents of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service,' with the assistance of approxi-
mately forty-six Massachusetts State Troopers, conducted a "sweep" op-
eration at Suffolk Downs Race Track. Eighty-three workers were
arrested. The raid, ironically code-named "Operation Homestretch,"
was proclaimed in an INS press release, the "largest single enforcement
operation ever undertaken by the Boston INS District."
2
Intake interviews conducted by volunteer attorneys elicited many alle-
gations of extensive mistreatment of the arrestees, including kicking, hit-
ting, pushing, tight handcuffing, deprivation of food and water for up to
eight hours, and a variety of procedural irregularities.' Further, it
quickly became apparent that many of the arrests themselves were based
solely on the "Hispanic appearance" of the racetrack workers.
At Master Calendar deportation hearings,4 many attorneys moved to
* Visiting Faculty, Vermont Law School; Adj. Ass't Professor of Legal Research and
Writing, Boston College Law School; Immigration Supervisor, Cambridgeport Problem
Center, Cambridge, Mass. I wish to thank David Baron, Barbara Kellogg, and Jim Wilton for
their research assistance. Thanks also to Susan Akram, Alex Aleinikoff, Rhonda Berkower,
Phyllis Goldfarb, Dan Kesselbrenner, Harvey Kaplan, and Victoria Lewis for ideas and inspi-
ration, and to Dean Daniel Coquillette for his continuous support.
1. Hereinafter "INS."
2. Documentation regarding the Suffolk Downs arrests is on file with the P.A.I.R. Project,
294 Washington Street, Boston, Mass. See also van Niekerk, 83 Illegal Aliens Arrested in Raid
at Suffolk Downs, Boston Globe, October 22, 1988; Blake, A Constitutional Battle in Immigra-
tion Court, Boston Globe, December 11, 1989; Hays, 5th Amendment Right To Silence is De-
bated in Aliens' Cases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1989.
3. The defense of the Suffolk Downs cases was undertaken by the Suffolk Downs Project,
which later became known as the P.A.I.R. Project. Initiated to recruit and train lawyers from
the private bar to represent all the Suffolk Downs workers who sought representation, on apro
bono basis, the P.A.I.R. Project continues to monitor, coordinate, and guide the strategy of all
the remaining Suffolk Downs cases, approximately thirty of which are still pending before the
immigration courts or the Board of Immigration Appeals [hereinafter BIA].
4. The Master Calendar hearing is roughly analogous to an arraignment.
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suppress statements and other evidence allegedly taken from the ar-
restees in violation of the fourth and fifth amendments.' The arrestees
(now called "respondents" in deportation proceedings) also invoked their
privilege under the self-incrimination clause and, based on that privilege,
and upon the argument that the government cannot prove its case
through compelled testimony, refused to answer any questions.
6
Under such circumstances, the immigration courts frequently proceed
to a conceptually separate suppression hearing,7 or the INS may seek to
introduce "untainted" evidence to support the allegations contained in
the Order to Show Cause. But in the Suffolk Downs case, the govern-
ment attempted a unique tactic.
Rather than introducing untainted evidence or seeking to prove that
the challenged evidence could withstand constitutional scrutiny, the INS
sought to coipel the respondent to testify' as to the elements of the gov-
ernment's prima facie cases. To circumvent the assertion of a fifth
amendment self-incrimination privilege,9 the INS attorney introduced
into evidence an agency order' 0
At least two immigration judges have found this procedure sufficient
5. The decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), limited the class of evi-
dence derived from allegedly illegal searches or seizures that may be suppressed. If the circum-
stances of the search or seizure constitute an "egregious violation" of the fourth amendment or
other liberties that might transgress notions of "fundamental fairness and undermine the pro-
bative value of the evidence obtained," the evidence cannot be used to prove deportability. Id.
at 1050-51. It is an open question whether detention of individuals based solely on Hispanic
appearance is "egregious" within the meaning of Lopez-Mendoza. See Arguelles-Vasquez v.
INS, 786 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 844 F.2d 700 (9th Cir.
1988). The allegations in the Suffolk Downs cases, however, went far beyond this threshold
question. They included arguments that the warrant was invalid; see Blackie's House of Beef,
Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (adopting a "flexible" balancing test of
INS needs and private rights); International Molders and Allied Worker's Local Union No.
164 v. Nelson, 674 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (Warrant of Inspection held "patently
invalid" to justify arrests); that the conduct of the conduct of the arrests and interrogation
violated 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 regarding statement of rights to be given an arrestee; see In re Gar-
cia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325 (BIA 1980); that the arrests violated the injunction issued in
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 387 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (mandating certain pro-
cedures to be followed when INS arrests "all citizens and nationals of El Salvador eligible to
apply for political asylum"); that the circumstances of the arrests, detentions and interroga-
tions rendered all statements coerced under the fifth amendment unusable; see Navia-Duran v.
INS, 568 F.2d 803, 810 (1st Cir. 1977) (statement taken in atmosphere of coercion and intimi-
dation cannot be used to prove deportability); and that the use of Massachusetts State troopers
was illegal under state law and thus violated respondents' right to due process. See Massachu-
setts Executive Order No. 257 (October 4, 1985). The extensiveness of these violations might
relate to Justice O'Connor's first caveat in Lopez-Mendoza, which states: "Our conclusions
concerning the exclusionary rule's value might change, if there developed good reason to be-
lieve that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread." 468 U.S. at 1050.
6. See infira Part I.A.
7. See Matter of Barcenas, Int. Dec. 3054 (BIA 1988). But see Matter of Benitez, Int. Dec.
2979 (BIA 1984) (no right to a separate hearing on suppression).
8. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent on Interlocutory Appeal at 2, Matter of Portillo Morales.
9. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self..." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. The agency order was purportedly issued pursuant to the federal immunity statute. 18
U.S.C. §§ 6001 - 6005 (1988).
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to grant immunity, thus obviating the fifth amendment privilege. " The
respondent, however, still declined to testify, arguing that the immunity
grant was defective, and, more generally, that the government cannot
prove its case by compelling them to testify. The INS then asked the
immigration judge to draw an adverse inference from the respondent's
continuing refusal to testify and, with no other evidence, to determine
that each respondent was an alien and subject to deportation on the
grounds charged. To the surprise of most observers, the immigration
judges did so. 2
Is there anything wrong with the procedure just described? If the
grant of immunity is valid, is there still a statutory or constitutional priv-
ilege or "right" to remain silent? And, if there is no such right, why
can't an immigration judge simply deem all of the government's allega-
tions true? After all, isn't that the most efficient, most direct, and fairest
way to proceed?
These questions involve some of the most fundamental issues in United
States immigration law. What rights do respondents have in deportation
proceedings? How should the balance among efficiency, fact-finding, and
fairness be struck? What role does the Constitution play in this realm?
To reach these basic problems, we must first consider the complex re-
lationship between the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause and
civil deportation proceedings. As there is little doubt that a respondent
in deportation proceedings cannot be compelled to testify as to matters
which could form the basis for a criminal prosecution, and many of the
relevant questions in the Suffolk Downs cases did involve potential crimi-
nal violations, a grant of immunity would be the only way to override the
fifth amendment privilege. But was the agency order an effective grant of
immunity? This question, essentially one of statutory construction, is a
close call. For purposes of this article, however, it will be answered af-
firmatively in order to reach the deeper questions raised by the Suffolk
Downs cases. The threshold procedural issues are considered in Part II.
As the Suffolk Downs inference is, in effect, the equivalent of a compul-
sion to testify, a logical first question is whether the Immigration and
Nationality Act 3 authorizes such compulsion. Unfortunately, neither
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. The reason most observers were surprised is that this adverse inference procedure has,
at least in reported cases, never been tried before. It seems largely derived from a law review
article by Henry G. Watkins. See Watkins, Streamlining Deportation Proceedings, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1075 (1985).
A similar issue was presented to the Fifth Circuit in Matter of Fuentes and Cruz Hernandez,
No. 88-2215 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1989 reh'g denied March 17, 1989). In that case, the govern-
ment sought to require the respondents to testify against their interest at their own deportation
hearings. The District Court upheld an immunity order and compelled the testimony. The
case, however, became moot and was never decided by the Fifth Circuit.
13. Pub. L. No. 820-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1557 (1988) [hereinafter "INA"].
1990]
602 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
the plain language of the statute nor congressional intent are clear on this
point. I will argue that this ambiguity supports the position of the re-
spondent that testimony cannot be compelled. Further, to the extent that
the drawing of an adverse inference relieves the INS of its burden in an
adversarial setting, it undermines the independent, adjudicative stance
that immigration judges should take. Finally, as a specific procedural
critique of what took place in the Suffolk Down cases, I will argue that
the better practice would have been for the immigration judge to direct
the INS to an Article III judge' 4 to seek a contempt order. In that set-
ting a full evidentiary hearing could have been the predicate for a thor-
ough constitutional and equitable balancing.
The heart of the Suffolk Downs problem is addressed in Part III. Can
the inference drawn from silence sustain an order of deportability absent
a scintilla of supporting evidence? The answer to this question is clearly,
not without a complete restructuring of the statutory scheme and the
overruling of Supreme Court precedent. The government may not prove
deportability solely by silence. If an adverse inference may be drawn, its
effect, at most, should be to corroborate and support other admissible
evidence.
In Part IV, the article considers the constitutional and policy questions
raised by the Suffolk Downs procedure. These include whether the al-
leged constitutional violations in the raid and arrests are, or should be,
relevant to the analysis of the propriety of the procedure, and whether a
respondent can, by any means, be forced to prove the government's case
against herself. Though courts have not yet grappled with this unique
approach to proving deportability, the article concludes with a number of
arguments against it.
I. DEPORTATION, CRIME, AND IMMUNITY
A. The Self-Incrimination Privilege in Deportation Proceedings
Once the government made the tactical decision, in the Suffolk Downs
cases, to circumvent the respondents' Motions to Suppress, it was left
with only two traditional options: introduce previously gathered un-
tainted evidence or gather new untainted evidence. Lacking untainted
evidence, the government could either send investigators out to find wit-
nesses, birth certificates, or other evidence of alienage and deportability;
or it could use the respondent's identity to search its own records for
evidence, such as the over-staying of a tourist or student visa.' 5 Of
14. An Article III judge is a member of the judicial branch as defined in Article III of the
Constitution. Administrative judges, including immigration judges, and Article I judges, in-
cluding bankruptcy judges, enjoy less power and protection than Article III judges. U.S.
CONST. art. III.
15. "The 'body' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is
never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful
[Vol. 4:599
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course, much time and effort could be saved if the government attorney
could simply call the respondent as a witness and ask, in essence: "Are
you an alien, and if so, are you deportable?"
The first strong objection to this practice derives from the self-incrimi-
nation clause of the fifth amendment. The privilege has long been recog-
nized to apply not only in criminal proceedings, but in "any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers
might incriminate [a witness] in future criminal proceedings." 1 6 Though
deportation proceedings have traditionally been deemed "civil," 17 there
is no doubt that the privilege may be asserted in this context," where the
testimony sought might result in criminal prosecution in addition to
deportation.
Deportation proceedings frequently raise the possibility of collateral
criminal proceedings. For example, INA section 275 authorizes criminal
prosecution for entry without inspection, which is perhaps the most com-
mon basis for deportation of aliens in the United States. 9
Courts have recognized that a claim of privilege may be based solely
on the assertion that the evidence sought would provide a "link in the
chain" of prosecution. 2' Therefore, admissions of alienage, or undocu-
arrest, search, or interrogation occurred." Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039 (drawing a star-
tling analogy between arrested aliens and "contraband or forfeited property"). Thus, a com-
mon way to prove alienage and deportability is to link the respondent's identity to proof of
foreign birth and INS records.
16. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967) (in
delinquency proceedings "the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of pro-
ceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission
and the exposure which it invites."). See also United States v. United States Coin and Cur-
rency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) (civil forfeiture proceedings); Gonzales v. McEwen, 435 F. Supp.
460 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (school disciplinary proceedings).
17. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038. The question whether the fifth amendment
might protect against deportation is considered infra Part IV.
18. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984);
Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1978); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.
1975); Matter of Carrillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 30 (BIA 1979). See also, Watkins, supra note 12 (in
which the concept of using silence as sufficient evidence to support finding of deportability first
appeared).
19. Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigra-
tion officers, or (3) obtains entry into the United States by a willfully false or misleading
representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall, for the first commis-
sion of any such offenses, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof be
punished by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than
$500, or by both, and for a subsequent commission of any such offenses shall be guilty
of a felony and upon conviction thereof be punished by imprisonment for not more than
two years, or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or both.
INA § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988). See also INA §§ 252(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1260(c), (crewman
overstay); INA § 264(e) 8 U.S.C. § 304(e) (18 or over without documents); INA § 266, 18
U.S.C. § 1306 (willful failure to register to notify INS of change of address; fraudulent state-
ments, counterfeiting); INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (reentry after deportation).
20. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 11 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951)).
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mented residence in the United States,2 1 though not crimes, cannot be
coerced if the respondent has a valid fear of prosecution under a statute
in which these facts are elements.22 Of course, the fifth amendment priv-
ilege "protects against real dangers, not remote and speculative possibili-
ties." 23  Given the rarity of collateral criminal prosecutions in
deportation cases, it might be argued that the privilege should not be
effective in this context.24 But the courts have consistently declined to
adopt this approach,25 and have tended to err on the side of protection.26
Where the government, in a deportation case, seeks to elicit testimony
from the respondent regarding alienage, employment, changes of ad-
dress, etc., a timely assertion of the fifth amendment privilege should
prevent such a line of questioning.
However, this does not end the inquiry in a "civil" deportation case.
First, as noted above, the government is permitted to determine the re-
spondent's identity and to derive information from that. A second, more
relevant, possibility is the drawing of an adverse inference from privi-
leged silence.
B. The Consequences of Asserting the Privilege in Deportation
Proceedings
No inferences may be drawn from privileged silence in criminal
cases.27 Although the Supreme Court had, for many years, held it imper-
missible to burden the assertion of the privilege in the civil context as
well,2" this changed dramatically with the decision in Baxter v. Palmigi-
ano.29 Palmigiano, a state prisoner, was charged with inciting a distur-
bance in prison. He was informed at a disciplinary hearing that his
conduct could also result in state criminal prosecution. He invoked the
privilege and the disciplinary board, after taking other evidence, found
him guilty and placed him in punitive segregation. The Supreme Court
21. But see INA § 266(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (criminalizing the willful failure to register
or notify INS of a change of address).
22. But if the grounds charged for deportation do not implicate a crime, a respondent's
claim of privilege is more tenuous. See Matter of Santos, Int. Dec. 2969 (BIA 1984) (no crime
implicated by visa overstay). The Board in Santos, however, failed to consider the other poten-
tial crimes above. Id
23. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972).
24. See Watkins, supra note 12, at 1084.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973).
26. See Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle - The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91
YALE L.J. 1062, 1085-87 (1982) (explaining some of the underlying justifications for this more
expansive approach in the general civil context).
27. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
See also Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt From Silence: Griffin v. Cali-
fornia After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REv. 841 (1980).
28. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (cancelling of government contracts); Uni-
formed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Sanitation Comm'n, 392 U.S. 280 (1973) (government em-
ployment); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (attorney discipline); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967) (police employment).
29. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
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assumed that adverse inferences had been drawn from Palmigiano's priv-
ileged silence, but upheld the Board's order. Relying primarily on a rigid
civil/criminal distinction, Justice White reasoned that "permitting an ad-
verse inference to be drawn from an inmate's silence at his disciplinary
proceedings is not, on its face, an invalid practice."30 The Court distin-
guished the Garrity-Lejkowitz line of cases as having been based upon the
automatic imposition of penalties for the refusal to testify. In Baxter,
however, the disciplinary measures were not automatic. The inference
there was of the type which arises when parties to civil actions "refuse to
testify in response to probative evidence offered against them."3 Other
incriminating evidence, besides Palmigiano's silence, had been properly
presented at the hearing. The Court felt it was significant that, under
relevant state law, it was "undisputed that an inmate's silence in and of
itself is insufficient to support an adverse decision by the Disciplinary
Board."32 Thus, in the case where it first permitted the adverse inference
from privileged silence, the Court could accept neither an "automatic"
penalty nor, so to speak, a conclusive inference. Justice Brennan, in dis-
sent, in Baxter, argued that "settled jurisprudence until today has been
that it is constitutionally impermissible for the government to impose
noncriminal penalties as a means of compelling individuals to forego the
privilege." 33 Brennan was unimpressed by the "automatic imposition"
distinction, saying it "plainly will not wash."' 34 Noting that the premise
of the Garrity-Lefcowitz line was that a sanction made the exercise of the
privilege "costly," Brennan highlights an ominous fact in the Baxter rec-
ord: the only evidence, other than Palmigiano's silence before the Disci-
plinary Board, consisted of written reports by the prison officials who
had filed the charges.35 Thus, the automatic distinction was hard to rec-
oncile with the facts of the case. Finally, Brennan noted a critical dis-
tinction between civil cases involving only private parties, and those
which involve interrogation by a government official.3 6 The latter class
of cases invokes one of the fundamental purposes of the fifth amendment:
"to preserve our adversary system of criminal justice by preventing the
government from circumventing that system by abusing its powers." '37
Since Baxter, the Court has continued to focus its attention on the
nature of the inference drawn from silence, rather than on the prophylac-
tic purposes of the fifth amendment. The Court has reaffirmed that when
30. Id. at 320.
31. Id. at 318.
32. Id at 317. The relevant Rhode Island state law required that disciplinary decisions
"must be based on substantial evidence manifested in the record of the disciplinary proceed-
ings." Id. (quoting Morris v. Travisino, 310 F. Supp. 857, 873 (D.R.I. 1970)).
33. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 331.
35. Id. at 332 n. 6.
36. Id. at 334.
37. Id. (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976) (emphasis in original)).
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an assertion of the privilege in response to government inquiry triggers
an immediate, automatic sanction, such sanction is unconstitutional.3a
In the Suffolk Downs cases, if the respondents' assertion of the privi-
lege was proper, then the automatic drawing of a conclusive adverse in-
ference seems contrary to the Baxter rule. Though deportation is not a
criminal sanction, it has always been recognized as a penalty. 39 The im-
position of the sanction, the finding of deportability, was immediate and
automatic upon the assertion of the privilege. There was no other evi-
dence in the record. Absent a valid grant of immunity, then, there seems
little doubt that the deportation orders thus derived cannot stand.
40
C. The Agency Order
The Order brought to the Suffolk Downs hearings purports to grant
immunity under the federal immunity statute.41 This statute, however,
was not expressly made applicable to deportation proceedings.4 2 18
U.S.C. section 6004(a) provides that when an individual is called to ap-
38. See Lefkowitz v, Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). In Lefkowitz, the Court expressly
reiterated that "[r]espondent's silence in Baxter was only one of a number of factors to be
considered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty." Id. at 808 n.5. The implications of
Baxter can also be seen in Dellacroce v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 269 (1984). When the IRS
assesses a deficiency against a taxpayer, the deficiency determination ordinarily is considered
presumptively correct and the burden of proof (i.e., the burden of presenting evidence) rests
with the taxpayer. But if it is shown that an assessment is "arbitrary and erroneous," then the
burden shifts back to the IRS. "[A] deficiency determination which is not supported by proper
foundation of substantive evidence is clearly arbitrary and erroneous." Id. at 281 (citing
Weinerskrich v. Commission (citation omitted)). Dellacroce, relying on Baxter, concluded
that negative inferences drawn from invocation of the privilege were not entitled to "probative
weight" for the purpose of deciding whether the deficiency determination is supported by sub-
stantive evidence. The tax court reasoned that because the negative inference can be made
only when the taxpayer refused to testify in response to probative evidence against him, si-
lence, in the absence of other evidence, cannot be used as the very probative evidence required
to support the assessment. The negative inference can be drawn only when the taxpayer is
confronted with "substantive evidence" and, therefore, silence cannot in and of itself compose
the IRS's case against the taxpayer. Id.
39. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) which states:
Here the liberty of an individual is at stake .... Though deportation is not technically a
criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the
right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty -
at times a most serious one - cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest
the procedure by which he is deprived of the liberty not meet the essential standards of
fairness.
40. See, e.g., Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
920 (1969) (holding that an immigration judge may draw a Baxter type adverse inference from
respondent's assertion of the privilege where the government has already proven its prima facie
case with untainted evidence).
41. The current federal immunity statute derives from the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. 2 § 201 (a), 84 Stat. 926 (1970), 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005
(1988), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 4007, 4008. Its primary purpose
was to standardize grants of immunity, to limit such grants to "use" rather than "transac-
tional" immunity, and to limit grants of immunity to cases where the Attorney General or
designated subordinates determine that the gain of a witness' testimony outweighs the loss of
opportunity to prosecute that witness. Obviously, its focus is crime, not deportability. See




pear before "an agency of the United States," the agency may, with the
approval of the Attorney General, issue an order requiring testimony in
return for a grant of "use" immunity.43 However, an "agency of the
United States" includes "any executive department as defined in section
101 of Title 5, United States Code." 44 Although it would seem obvious
that the INS is an agency or "executive department" under the APA, for
the purposes of deportation proceedings, this is not necessarily so. In
Marcello v. Bonds,45 the Supreme Court held that the INA supersedes
the APA in deportation proceedings. Thus, challenges to statutory de-
portation procedures based upon lack of compliance with the APA gen-
erally fail.
Counsel for respondents in the Suffolk Downs cases argued that if the
APA does not govern procedures in deportation cases, it should not gov-
ern the definition of an agency either, where that definition will materi-
ally affect hearing procedures."
In the Fuentes and Hernandez case47 the government had actually con-
ceded that section 6004 did not apply to deportation proceedings.4" In
colloquy before the district court, Assistant United States Attorney Hall
explained the government's position:
THE COURT: What is the problem with using 6004, Mr. Hall?
MR. HALL: I am told that Congress did not intend to-
THE COURT: Who told you that?
MR. HALL: The person in the Department of Justice who works on
these things for the Attorney General...
THE COURT: What's wrong with reading 6004 to mean you just
go over in front of the Special Inquiry Officer and go ahead and
grant it that way?
MR. HALL: Because Congress didn't intend it to apply to deporta-
tion proceedings over which the Attorney -
THE COURT: They didn't say that in the statute.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988) authorizes a district court, under certain circumstances, to
issue such an order as well. Use immunity protects the witness from the use of answers or the
"fruits" derived from the answers. Transactional immunity protects the witness from ever
being prosecuted for the matter about which testimony is given. Either form of immunity is
sufficient to override the privilege. See Tierney v. United States, 409 U.S. 1232 (1972); Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 6001, referring to the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA].
45. 349 U.S. 302 (1955). Marcello, a respondent in a deportation proceeding, had argued
that his hearing violated the APA because the special inquiry officer had been subject to INS
control, where the APA mandates an "independent" adjudicator. The Court carefully com-
pared the INA and APA and determined that the Immigration Act's "detailed coverage of the
same subject matter dealt with in the hearing provisions of the INA" must control. Id. at 308.
46. The argument was also raised that the "public interest" requirement of 18 U.S.C.
§ 6004 cannot be determined by the INS, in light of 28 C.F.R. § 0.175 (1990), which limits the
authority of the Attorney General to delegate the power to authorize grants of immunity.
47. No. 88-2215 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1989 reh'g denied March 17, 1989).
48. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 31, Matter of Fuentes and Cruz Hernandez (1955)
(quoting the government position that section 6004 "does not envision deportation proceed-
ings. It's talking about administrative proceedings other than those conducted under the au-
thority of the Attorney General.").
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MR. HALL: Well, I think that if you consider the statutes together,
they are not going to talk about an agency as some separate entity
unless they meant it was some agency other than the Department of
Justice.
THE COURT: Well, the statute itself defines "agency," and it
doesn't say that it excludes the Department of Justice, does it?
Mr. HALL: I think title five has a definition which includes the
Department of Justice, but it still doesn't explain the obvious-
THE COURT: Nothing in section 6001 with regard to the defini-
tion of the agency of the United States excludes the Department of
Justice ....
The problem in the Fifth Circuit, however, was that if section 6004 didn't
apply, then the government could only rely on sections 6002 and 6003,
which authorize the district court (as opposed to the agency) to grant
immunity. Serious jurisdictional questions were raised regarding the
power of the district court to grant immunity under the specific circum-
stances of those cases. Thus, the district court judge, though professing
some concern about whether it was correct to do so, granted the con-
tempt order.50
In the First Circuit, the government chose to rely on the section 6004
procedure, despite having taken the opposite position in the Fifth Cir-
cuit. This certainly seems to be the better approach, given the jurisdic-
tional difficulties inherent in sections 6002 and 6003. Nevertheless, it is
far from clear that the INS is empowered, under section 6004, to grant
immunity to the respondent in deportation proceedings. Though the
plain language of the immunity statute and the APA support the govern-
ment position, the Marcello hurdle is significant.
Although there has been no definitive judicial answer to the deporta-
tion immunity question, the circuits have split on an analogous issue:
whether the Equal Access to Justice ACT (EAJA) 5' authorizes an award
of attorney's fees to an alien who prevails in deportation proceedings.
The award of fees is restricted to adversary adjudications.5 2 The ques-
tion under the EAJA is whether the APA definition can be imported into
the INA. This requires interpretation of both EAJA and, as per Mar-
cello, the relationship between the APA and the INA. The government
has argued that deportation hearings cannot be defined as "under section
554" of the APA unless they were "directly governed" by that section.5 3
The Ninth Circuit has found the government's reliance on Marcello to be
technical and misplaced in light of the functional approach to "adversary
49. Appellant's opening Brief at 33; Marcello, 349 U.S. at 302.
50. Id at 33-35.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1990) [hereinafter EAJF]
52. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(l)(E) (adversary adjudications are defined in 5 U.S.C. § 554).
53. See Escob.-r-Ruiz v. INS, 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn, Escobar-Ruiz v.
INS, 813 F.2d 283, 287 (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Escobar II]; Escobar-Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d
1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane) [hereinafter Escobar III].
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adjudications" mandated by the legislative history and model implement-
ing regulations of the EAJA.54 Rather than accepting the government's
invitation to interpret "under section 554" in a narrow and definitional
way, the court instead chose to adopt a flexible standard which included
all agency proceedings "as defined by section 554" as well as those "di-
rectly governed" by the section. 55
Further, the court took exception to the government's reading of Mar-
cello. Writing for the court en banc Judge Reinhardt construed the hold-
ing of that case much more narrowly:
The Court examined both statutes and concluded that when Con-
gress drafted the hearing provisions of the INA it used the APA as a
model, drawing on the APA provisions and 'adapting them to the
particular needs of the deportation process.' 349 U.S. at 308-09, 75
S. Ct. at 160-61. But Marcello did not hold that deportation pro-
ceedings are excluded or exempted from section 554... only that
the INA 'supersedes' the hearing provisions of the APA- that is,
that when the two statutes diverge, the more specialized hearing
provisions of the INA govern. See 349 U.S. at 309-10, 75 S. Ct. at
761-62. Moreover, the discrepancy between the INA and the APA
that the Marcello court found critical has since been eradicated ....
[A]mendments to the immigration regulations have virtually elimi-
nated the distinction between the two statutes' definitions of the
hearing officer's role... [and t]he hearing provisions for the INA
and the APA are now fundamentally identical. 6
In contrast to the Escobar cases, the D.C., Third, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits have found EAJA not to apply to deportation cases.5" These
courts have combined a strict construction of EAJA itself with both a
general Marcello argument that the APA cannot apply in this context,
and a specific reliance on section 292 of the INA, which states that indi-
viduals involved in deportation proceedings have the right to be repre-
sented by counsel of their choice "at no expense to the government.158
The EAJA cases demonstrate the unsettled character of the relation-
ship between the INA and other laws. It is thus hard to predict what
courts will do with the immunity statute, but the analysis should turn on
two factors: the purposes behind the immunity statute, and the extent to
which the INA deportation procedures can be said to preclude adminis-
54. Id at 1023-24.
55. Id at 1024.
56. Id. at 1025. See also Note, Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hear-
ings, 97 YALE LJ 1459, 1460 n.11 (1988) (citing No Supreme Court Review in Escobar Ruiz, 65
Interpreter Releases 540 (May 23, 1988)). The INS did not seek certiorari in the Escobar-Ruiz
cases but has indicated that it will try to have the cases reversed by taking a "more appropriate
case" to the Supreme Court in the future.
57. See Ardestani v. INS, 904 F.2d 1505 (1 th Cir. 1990); Clark v. INS, 904 F.2d 172 (3rd
Cir. 1990); St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Owens v.
Brock, 860 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1988).
58. See Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1513.
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trative grants of immunity. As to the first factor, there is no question
that the immunity statute was aimed at criminal conduct, not de-
portability. Thus, to use it in a setting where only deportability is at issue
seems unwarranted. However, there is also no specific requirement of a
criminal investigative object to the statute, and a reasonable argument
can be made that courts should not impose one. The Attorney General,
in this view, should be granted the leeway to conduct investigations as he
sees fit.
As to the INA, there is no immunity analog to section 292 of the
EAJA. The statute simply is silent on this issue. As the court noted in
Marcello, however, section 242(b) expressly states that "[t]he procedure
[herein prescribed] shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for deter-
mining the deportability of an alien under this section. '" 9 Though the
INA does not expressly authorize grants of immunity in deportation
cases, it rather specifically covers other procedural matters. Unlike
EAJA, but like the procedures considered in Marcello, the grant of im-
munity is an integral part of the deportation hearing. Therefore, absent
explicit congressional guidance, it would more clearly contradict section
242 and Marcello to import the immunity procedure into the INA.
In sum, the immunity question is a close one. To answer it, courts
should also consider the full implications of the routine use of adminis-
trative grants of immunity in deportation cases. The proponents of the
Suffolk Downs approach mince no words as to their view of the role of
the Constitution in deportation cases:
Thus, where immunity from prosecution is granted, a respondent
must answer all questions concerning alienage and deportability.
This will substantially reduce the myriad constitutional, procedural,
and evidentiary problems in deportation proceedings. The Supreme
Court in Lopez-Mendoza eliminated fourth amendment issues in de-
portation proceedings. Additionally, the Attorney General or the
various United States Attorneys can all but eliminate the fifth
amendment issues, right to counsel claims, and many procedural
and evidentiary problems in deportation proceedings by following
the approach outlined above.'
Despite the problems discussed above, the use of the immunity statute
59. Marcello, 349 U.S at 309.
60. Watkins, supra note 12, at 1093. This chilling agenda seems to be based on the eleva-
tion of "efficiency" (i.e., deporting the greatest numbers in the shortest time) to unprecedented
heights. Aliens have, for more than 100 years, borne the brunt of an irrational constitutional
analysis. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Schuck, The Transformation of Immi-
gration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984); Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 9 (Winter 1990). Instead of devising elaborate schemes
to avoid compliance with the basic human rights mandated by the fourth and fifth amend-




in this unique context might very well be upheld. Promises of immunity
are traditionally interpreted liberally;6 and though there is no "organ-
ized crime" object in most deportation cases, it is quite possible that
courts will defer to the Justice Department on the question of whether
the law has been properly invoked. This will lead to an analysis of the
propriety of drawing, and the weight to be accorded, an adverse inference
from a respondent's silence.
II. CAN THE RESPONDENT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY?
If the immunity order procedure is at least facially valid, the question
remains whether the respondent's continuing refusal to testify may result
in an adverse inference. The answer to this question depends, first, on
whether the immigration judge is, in any way, authorized to compel the
respondent to testify; or, conversely, if the respondent may stand mute
and demand that the government prove its case with extrinsic evidence.
The second issue then is whether the drawing of an adverse inference is a
permissible action for the immigration judge to take.
A. The Power to Compel the Respondent to Testify
The government generally bears the burden of proof in deportation
proceedings, though in a narrow class of cases, Congress has shifted the
burden to the respondent.62 The Suffolk Downs cases raise the question
whether, in that class of cases in which the government has the burden of
proof, and that burden can be satisfied by compelling the respondent to
testify. The INA answers this question only obliquely.
The INA clearly authorizes interrogation by both the immigration
judge and the government prosecutor. Section 242(b) states:
A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this sec-
tion to determine the deportability of any alien, and shall administer
oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-
examine the alien or witnesses, and as authorized by the Attorney
General, shall make determinations, including orders of
deportations.... 63
Provision is then made for "'an additional immigration officer," who
has authority "to present evidence, and to interrogate, examine and
cross-examine the alien or other witnesses. . . ."64 It therefore, seems
clear that the respondent may, at least, be called to testify at her
61. See, e.g., In re Application of President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191
(1 th Cir. 1985) (application for immunity by acting Attorney General upheld notwithstand-
ing lack of statutory authority).
62. See infra Part III.
63. INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
64. Id.
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hearing.65
But does the power under section 242 "to interrogate" necessarily in-
clude the power to compel answers? The power to interrogate does not
directly include the power to compel answers because immigration
judges are not granted contempt power. The closest the statute comes to
compelling the testimony of the respondent is section 235(a), which
states that: "The Attorney General and any immigration officer, includ-
ing special inquiry officers, shall have the power to subpoena witnesses...
and to that end may invoke the aid of any court of the United
States.... 66
Since a subpoena is generally defined as a command to testify at a
certain time and place, the implication of compulsion may be more read-
ily found in section 235(a) than in the vague authorization "to interro-
gate" of section 242(b). If Congress has authorized the immigration
judge to subpoena the respondent, this could indicate an intent to permit
some testimony to be compelled. But section 235(a) does not mention
respondents in deportation proceedings at all; it refers only to
"witnesses.", 67
Is the respondent in deportation proceedings a "witness" within the
meaning of section 235(a)? The answer is not contained in the defini-
tional section of the INA. Nor does the legislative history provide any
guidance. 68 However, other sections of the INA maintain a distinction
between "witnesses" and the person who is the object of the proceedings.
Section 335(b), for instance, relating to naturalization petitions, permits
the subpoena of "witnesses, including petitioner."69 Section 242(b),
which governs deportation proceedings, also maintains the disjunction
between "the alien" and "witnesses."70 Given this consistent linguistic
separation, it would require some creativity for a court to hold that the
plain language of section 235(a) authorized the government to subpoena
the respondent to testify. 7
1
65. The foregoing assumes that "the alien" is a euphemism for the respondent. It is argua-
ble that section 242 interrogation is not permitted until alienage is proven.
66. INA § 235(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1988).
67. Id. Though section 235(a) deals primarily with inspection of arriving aliens, not de-
portation, the subpoena power extends to "any matter which is material and relevant to the
enforcement of the Act and for the administration of the Service," thus including deportation
proceedings. See United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 185 (1955).
68. See S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMnN. NEWS 1653, 1710.
69. INA § 335(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988); see also INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(1988) ("the alien or witnesses"); INA § 336(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988) ("the petitioner and
the witnesses").
70. INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988).
71. It is also interesting to note that section 235(a) provides that, "[a]ny person coming
into the United States, may be required to state under oath the purpose or purposes for which
he comes... or such other information as will aid the immigration officer .... INA § 235(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The absence of such a provision in section 242(b)
could be construed as intentional.
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Whether such a construction is permissible remains an open question.
A similar issue arose in United States v. Minker.72
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Minker, noted first that
the statute from which section 235(a) derived 73 had strictly limited the
purposes for which the INS could subpoena witnesses. It did not confer
such power as an aid to the investigation for potential naturalization of-
fenses.74 The 1952 Act, however, had greatly expanded the reach of the
subpoena power to include virtually every conceivable action of the
INS. 75 This does not necessarily mean that the objects of government
investigations could be considered witnesses. The word "witness" itself
was found to contain no inherent meaning in this regard:
If the answer to the question merely depended upon whether as a
matter of allowable English usage, the word "witness" may fairly
describe a person in the position of Minker . ..it could not be denied
that the word could as readily be deemed to cover persons in [his]
position as not. In short, the word is patently ambiguous: it can
fairly be applied to anyone who gives testimony in a proceeding,
although the proceeding immediately or potentially involves him as
a party, or it may be restricted to the person who gives testimony in
another's case.76
Justice Frankfurter was struck by the breadth of section 235(a), both
as to the type of investigation in which a subpoena may be issued and
that virtually any INS employee was entitled to issue it.77 This extensive
delegation argued for a restrictive reading, given the potentially oppres-
sive use of the subpoena power.78 The Court recognized that, although
technically "there can be no penalty incurred for contempt before there is
72. 350 U.S. 179 (1956). Minker was a naturalized United States citizen whom the INS
sought to subpoena as the subject of an investigation. Minker moved to quash the subpoena;
however, his motion was denied and he was ordered to appear and testify. When he disre-
garded this order he was adjudged in contempt and fined $500. In re Minker, 118 F. Supp. 264
(E.D. Pa. 1953). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a putative defend-
ant in denaturalization proceeding was not a "witness" within the meaning of INA section
235(a). U.S. v. Minker, 217 F.2d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 1954). In a companion case, the subjects of
the investigation agreed to appear, but refused to be sworn or testify. The INS's application
for an order of compliance was, however, denied by the district court. In re Barnes, 116 F.
Supp. 464 (N.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd, Barnes v. Oddo, 219 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1955) (granting
order of compliance).
73. Section 16 of the Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917),
provided:
Any commissioner of immigration or inspector in charge shall also have power to re-
quire by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses before said inspectors and
the production of books, papers, and documents touching the right of any alien to
enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States, and to that end may invoke
the aid of any court of the United States ....
74. Minker, 350 U.S. at 184.
75. See id. at 185.
76. Id at 186.
77. Id at 187.
78. Id.
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a judicial order of enforcement,"79 the subpoena itself has a "coercive
tendency."'
In light of the high stakes involved in denaturalization cases, the possi-
ble "loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth liv-
ing,"'" the court ultimately resolved the statutory doubt in Minker's
favor.
2
Justice Black, in concurrence, saw the issue in more procedural terms.
He noted that the immigration officer who summoned Minker was not
acting in a judicial or even a quasi-judicial capacity. 3 Rather, "the ca-
pacity in which the immigration officer was acting was precisely the same
as that of a policeman, constable, sheriff, or Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion agent who interrogates a person, perhaps himself a suspect, in con-
nection with a murder or some other crime." '84 Though noting
important distinctions among admission, deportation, and denaturaliza-
tion cases, Justice Black explained: "A purpose to subject aliens, much
less citizens, to a police practice so dangerous to individual liberty as this
should not be read into an Act of Congress in the absence of a clear and
unequivocal congressional mandate." 5
No such mandate could be found. 86 The Minker decision thus derives
primarily from the general principle that ambiguous statutory language
should be construed strictly against the government's assertion of intru-
sive, potentially abusive power. Of course, implicit in this rule of con-
struction is a value judgment that there are not sufficient countervailing
reasons to grant the government the power sought. This calculus bal-
ances the stakes of the proceedings for the individual against the needs of
the government, with for some, like Justice Black, procedural issues like
the blurring of adjudicative and inquisitiorial functions also assuming im-
portance. Obviously, this unarticulated balancing in statutory interpre-
tation is redolent of modem due process analysis.87
Minker's primary holding, that a "clear and unequivocal congressional
mandate" is required, would seem to apply to deportation as well as de-
79. Id (citing Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1942)).
80. Id.
81. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
82. Minker, 350 U.S. at 190.
83. Id. (Black, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 191.
85. Id at 192. Justice Black then implies, however, that the power may be acceptable in
the context of entry, control, and exclusion of aliens. Id at 194.
86. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, noted the conflict between the comprehensive de-
naturalization procedures mandated by section 340 of the Act and the power sought by the
government under section 235(a) (Douglas, J., concurring). Id at 196. Further, Justice Doug-
las "would require the Government to proceed with meticulous regard for the basic notions of
Due Process which protect every vital right of the American citizen." Id. at 197 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).




naturalization. But here the "stakes" and "efficiency" balance becomes
more difficult, and courts are divided on the question.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in Lee Tin Mew v. Jones.8 An
INS district director had subpoenaed Lee Tin Mew to appear and give
testimony.8 9 He was instructed that any statements he would make must
be "voluntary" and could be used against him in subsequent criminal or
deportation proceedings.' Lee Tin Mew refused to answer any substan-
tive questions.91 The INS then petitioned for, and obtained, an order
from the district court for Lee Tin Mew to appear and testify.92 His
motion to quash the order was denied.93
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court order was
"clearly erroneous" because the government had failed to lay a sufficient
foundation to establish the authority of the INS investigator to question
Lee Tin Mew.94
The decision is quite puzzling. The court first highlights defects in the
warrant, noting that it did not recite that the interrogation fit within the
parameters of section 235.9' However, the court then states that, "[t]he
whole section [235] seems to be geared to the examination of the qualifi-
cations of a person arriving at the border to enter the country and reside
therein."'96 Lee Tin Mew had in fact claimed to be a citizen, and the
court found this significant, without clearly detailing why.97
Judge Pope's concurrence is much more straightforward:
As I understand United States v. Minker. . .it must be held that
Congress had carefully differentiated between a witness who is not
the subject of an investigation and the person who is.... While the
appellant here was not the subject of that kind of an investigation
[denaturalization], he was clearly the subject of a similar investiga-
tion, namely, one looking to deportation.... In my view, the ra-
tionale which led to the decision in Minker is equally controlling
here.98
Conversely, in Sherman v. Hamilton,99 the First Circuit, while distin-
guishing denaturalization proceedings from deportation, reached the op-
posite conclusion. The Sherman court found Minker inapplicable to
deportation cases because, "the clear thrust of the opinion unmistakably





93. Id. at 377.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 379.
96. Id. at 379.
97. Id.
98. Id at 380 (Pope, J., concurring) (citations ommitted).
99. 295 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1961).
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shows that there the restricted reading of the term witness was grounded
narrowly on the conspicuous deference accorded the rights of citizens
wherever ambiguity presents freedom of choice between competing alter-
natives. '"1°" In regard to aliens, the court found such considerations
"distinctly absent."1 ' The court further relied on INA section 242(b)
which, as noted above, authorized interrogation of "the alien or wit-
nesses."1"2 In light of these provisions, the court felt it would be "an
exercise in futility for Congress to grant the Service authority to interro-
gate, examine, and cross-examine an alien and yet withhold the subpoena
power, a most meaningful device for accomplishing this end."10 3
The Sherman/Lee Tin Mew split thus encompasses two separate is-
sues: (1) to what extent are the rights of aliens in deportation cases
equivalent to those of citizens facing denaturalization; and (2) does the
statutory power to interrogate necessarily include the subpoena power
(or, more broadly) the power to compel an answer?
To the extent that Sherman was based upon a dichotomy between the
rights of respondents in deportation proceedings and citizens in denatu-
ralization proceedings, it seems to have been implicitly overruled by
Woodby v. INS."° In Woodby, the Supreme Court held that the INS has
the same burden of proof in deportation proceedings as in denaturaliza-
tion, noting that "the immediate hardship of deportation is often greater
than that inflicted by denaturalization, which does not, immediately at
least, result in expulsion from our shores." 5 Woodby, however, is a
strangely reasoned case, which certainly does not make deportation and
denaturalization equivalent in all respects. Sherman's second point, that
interrogation would be sterile1"e without subpoena power obviously only
arises if Minker and Woodby do not control.
Even if they do not, however, the Sherman logic may be questioned.
The power to subpoena the potential subject of a deportation hearing is
different from the power to subpoena an actual respondent in his own
deportation hearing. The former process is largely investigatory, the
later, primarily adversarial. The INA could be read to authorize subpoe-
nas of those under investigation, but not of those against whom an Order
to Show Cause1"7 has issued. This reading of section 242 gives the immi-
100. Id. at 519.
101. Id.
102.. Id. at 520; see also INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1988) (which applies to exclusion
hearings).
103. Sherman, 295 F.2d at 520. The court also noted that cases construing section 16 of
the Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917), had held that a sub-
poena could be issued to the potential subject of an investigation. See Loufakis v. United
States, 81 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1936); Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938).
104. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
105. Id. at 286. But see Laqui v. INS, 422 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1970) (INS may subpoena
and interrogate respondent).




gration judge the authority to ask questions that might clarify matters,
but says to the INS that once a decision is made to issue an OSC, the
procedural format has changed."I Such interrogation is hardly sterile; it
is simply not compulsory."°
Immigration judges themselves seem to accept the view that they can-
not compel testimony from the respondent. In the "Immigration Judge's
Benchbook," Chief Immigration Judge William R. Robie writes:
Special problems may arise when the respondent is called by the
INS on the deportability issue and he/she stands mute on the ques-
tion of alienage and deportability ... if you ascertain that the re-
spondent has no valid claim to privilege, you have every right to
direct him/her to answer the questions .... If the respondent still
refuses to testify after your direction to do so, you should refrain
from threats or badgering as this might raise the separate issue of
coerced testimony."o
The absence of any mention of section 235 is noteworthy, as is the con-
cern with testimony being freely given.
The regulations that control issuance of subpoenas also support this
interpretation. 8 C.F.R. section 287.4 clearly distinguishes pre-proceed-
ing and post-proceeding subpoenas. Prior to the commencement of pro-
ceedings, a large number of INS employees may issue subpoenas,
including district directors, assistant district directors, and supervisory
criminal investigators."' After an OSC issues, however, the subpoena
may only be issued by the immigration judge, "upon his/her own voli-
tion or upon application of a trial attorney, the alien, or other party
affected. " 1
2
The reasoning of the majority and concurrences in Minker, in light of
Woodby, also argue against permitting the government to subpoena the
respondent to a deportation hearing. The stakes and burden of proof in
denaturalization and deportation proceedings are recognized now as
roughly equivalent and the problems inherent in merging adjudicative
and inquisitorial functions are as real in deportation cases as in denatu-
ralization. More specifically, as with the denaturalization proceedings
considered in Minker, deportation proceedings are extensively controlled
108. INS regulations support the proposition that an OSC supplants a section 235 sub-
poena. The regulations state: "The Order shall call upon the respondent to appear before an
Immigration Judge for a hearing ...." 8 C.F.R. § 242.I(b)(1990).
109. See also 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) (1990) (delineating rights that attach after OSC issues,
including right to counsel); c.f. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1990) (distinguishing procedures to be fol-
lowed with aliens arrested without warrant, both before and after the examining officer deter-
mines that formal proceedings under INA sections 236, 237, or 242 will be instituted).
110. Immigration Judge's Benchbook, IV(B)(7)(d)(4) (unofficial compilation of practical
suggestions for immigration judges, gathered by William R. Robie, Chief Immigration Judge,
Sept. 1988) [hereinafter Benchbook].
111. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.4(a)(1),(2) (1990).
112. 8 C.F.R. § 287.4(a)(2)(ii) (1990).
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by statute and regulations. None of the statutes or regulations authorize
the government's use of a subpoena after an OSC has issued, in order to
make its prima facie case at the hearing. Therefore, the government
should not be held to have the authority to subpoena the respondent to
testify at her own deportation hearing.' This conclusion does not, of
course, prove that the testimony of the respondent may not be compelled
as implicit in the power "to interrogate" under section 242(b). However,
given the extensive attention paid to subpoenas in the INA, the specific
withholding of that authority once an OSC issues, and the policy consid-
eration of Minker and Woodby, such an interpretation would be unwar-
ranted. Furthermore, such an expansion of the power to interrogate
would raise serious questions about the proper role of the immigration
judge and the allocation of the burden of proof in deportation cases.
These will be considered next.
B. The Role of the Immigration Judge
There is, so to speak, a clear ambiguity in the INA concerning the role
of the immigration judge. This ambiguity is important in the Suffolk
Downs cases because, as Justice Black noted in Minker, the merging of
adjudication and inquisition, though not uncommon in administrative
proceedings, implicates distinctly American notions of fair procedure. 1
4
The procedure employed in the Suffolk Downs cases is best understood
as a decision by the immigration judge to participate in the interrogation
of the respondent before the government has presented any extrinsic evi-
dence. That is, at the point at which the respondent stood mute, the
judge had three traditional options: (1) terminate the proceedings for
lack of evidence; (2) grant a continuance to allow the government to seek
either a contempt order or extrinsic (untainted and admissible) evidence
of deportability; or (3) interrogate the respondent or attempt to convince
or coerce the respondent to testify.
The decision to draw an adverse inference, though unique historically,
is most like option three in that the judge participated in the govern-
ment's presentation of a prima facie case. Put more generically, the
judge in the Suffolk Downs cases leaned toward the inquisitorial role. It
is worth considering whether such a leaning is permissible.
In Marcello v. Bonds, as noted above, the Supreme Court held that the
APA did not preclude the merging of adjudicative and prosecutorial
113. See also Peters v. U.S., 853 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1988) (INS lacks power to issue "John
Doe" subpoenas, due to absence of statutory authority and procedural safeguards). But see
Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (INS regulation ordering Iranian stu-
dents to provide information upheld because, "the statute need not authorize each and every
action taken by the Attorney General, so long as his action is reasonably related to the duties
imposed upon him").
114. Minker, 340 U.S. at 191 (Black, J., concurring).
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functions in the INA.' 15 According to the Supreme Court, the INA sys-
tem was acceptable:
when considered against the long-standing practice in deportation
proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in the fed-
eral courts, and against the special considerations applicable to de-
portation which the Congress may take into account in exercising its
particularly broad discretion in immigration matters.' 16
There are, however, limits. First, the Court noted in Marcello that the
Attorney General could not dictate the actions of the BIA. Second, the
Court analyzed Marcello's specific allegations of prejudgment, although
it found them baseless.117 The holding of Marcello, then, can fairly be
read as authorizing some inquiry, on due process if not APA grounds,
into allegations that an immigration judge has not acted in a sufficiently
"judicial" way.
Under the INA itself, immigration judges stand somewhere between
prosecutors and judges. The hard question is: where do they stand on
this issue? The statute is not especially helpful. On the one hand, a "spe-
cial inquiry officer""' "shall conduct proceedings. . . administer oaths
... make determinations ... ."I" Provision is then made for an addi-
tional immigration officer to "present the evidence on behalf of the
United States." The special inquiry officer is prohibited from conducting
a proceeding in which he "shall have participated in investigative func-
tions or... (except as provided [in INA section 242(b)]) in prosecuting
functions."' 2 ° All of this sounds fairly judicial (adjudicative). On the
other hand, the special inquiry officer may present evidence, "interro-
gate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses." '121 Even the
presence of an additional immigration officer, "shall not be construed to
diminish the authority conferred upon the special inquiry officer con-
ducting such proceedings." '22 But can it possibly be the law that the
mixed role of the immigration law judge doesn't change once the INS
assigns a prosecutor to the case? Wouldn't such a system offend not only
notions of fairness, but logic as well? Although the drafters of the INA
did not resolve this tension, forty years of practice and administrative
regulation have. Thus, 8 C.F.R. section 242.16(c) now requires that an
INS general attorney 12 3 present the government's evidence in deportation
115. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310.
116. Id. at 311.
117. Id. at 313.
118. Presently known as an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (1990).




123. Also known as a trial attorney.
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proceedings, unless the alien concedes deportability. 24
Most importantly, since special inquiry officers were denominated in
the regulations as "immigration judges,"' 25 a trend toward a more "judi-
cial" posture has been apparent. Since 1983, the immigration judges
have been formally separated from the INS, and are organized in the
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR).'26 While the separa-
tion of EOIR from INS was clearly designed to support judicial indepen-
dence, some have argued for complete independence. 27  Others,
however, have questioned whether the "mere fact of a formal chain of
command running from adjudicators up to a Cabinet-level official who
retains enforcement responsibilities . . . substantially undermines inde-
pendence and neutrality."' 121 The immigration judges' maintenance of
these latter virtues in this view may depend on "the conception of their
own role that the adjudicating officers develop and how they reinforce
and develop that conception," and on how the supervisory authority is
exercised. 129 The immigration judges' own conception of their role is
generally independent and adjudicative. The "Immigration Judge's
Benchbook," advises:
After direct examination has been completed, allow for cross-exami-
nation, then redirect and recross. You may then examine the wit-
ness if you find it necessary to clear up any questions you might
have or to fully develop the record.... Remember, however, that
you are the impartial trier of fact, and that in a contested case it is
the role of the INS attorney to advocate his/her agency's
position. 130
Regardless of the best way to create, nurture, and protect it, a consen-
sus seems to have emerged that adjudicative independence from the INS
prosecutorial role, at least as to non-discretionary determinations and
procedural issues, is a good thing. It would be safe to assume that virtu-
ally all immigration judges aspire to this as well, because it is the best
guarantor of respect in the modern legal view.
Thus, our conclusion as to the proper role of an immigration judge
must be that, for purposes of procedural matters such as the interroga-
tion of the respondent, the judge should err toward the adjudicative side,
especially where an INS attorney has appeared on behalf of the govern-
124. In practice, so far as the author is aware, an INS attorney appears in all deportation
cases, even where deportability is conceded; thus the INA is viewed as a floor, not a ceiling.
125. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (promulgated in 1973).
126. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(n), 3.10 (1990) [hereinafter EOIR].
127. See, e.g., Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 1 (1980).
128. A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 91 (1984).
129. Id.




ment. This stance is supported, if not firmly required, by the basic pa-
rameters of due process, the INA, administrative regulations, and a
general consensus in the field. By agreeing to draw an adverse inference
from silence, in effect compelling the respondent to testify, the Suffolk
Downs immigration judge thus violated the procedural spirit, if not the
letter, of the law.
C. The Contempt Option
The usual remedy for a witness' failure to comply with a subpoena or
refusal to testify is a contempt order. In the first Suffolk Downs cases the
government sought a continuance for this purpose. Yet, later, the gov-
ernment declined even to seek such orders. The reasons for this tactical
decision are difficult to determine. The most plausible explanations are
expediency and, perhaps, fear of what an Article III judge might do with
these cases. The adverse inference was deemed a quicker and safer route.
The INS, of course, does not concede that the adverse inference is the
exact functional equivalent of a contempt order. Its view is that "a re-
spondent in deportation proceedings has no right to refuse to testify ex-
cept on a reasonable claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment."' 31
This lack of a "right" to refuse to testify is then bootstrapped to the
adverse inference remedy. Thus, the government argues, why waste time
and burden the federal courts with contempt petitions, when a faster
track exists?
Leaving aside the substantial question whether silence can quantita-
tively satisfy the government's burden,' a this unique circumvention of
the federal courts merits careful analysis. Initially, it is worth consider-
ing why, given its obvious efficiency, the government has rarely in its
century of experience with deportation cases, tried this tactic. 33 The
options seem limited to either an historical lack of creativity (which
gives a lot of credit to Judge Watkins' article) or a belief that the proce-
dure would not have been permitted by courts in the past but would be
upheld now.' 34
Assuming that the latter reason is the right one, we will have to con-
sider whether anything has changed recently in the judicial approach to
immigration law. 3 But it is also important, first, to consider whether a
131. See Memorandum in Opposition To Respondent's Motion to Suppress, No.
A28927247 (citations omitted).
132. See infra Part III, Section B.
133. "... just as established practice may shed light on the extent of power conveyed by
general statutory language, so the want of assertion of power by those who presumably would
be alert to exercise it, is equally significant in determining whether such power was actually
conferred." FTC v. Bunte Bros. Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 352 (1941) (citing Norwegian Nitrogen
Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)).
134. It is also true that the situation where an alien stands mute is relatively uncommon.
135. The only relevant possibility seems to be the decision in Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1032, which held the fourth amendment exclusionary rule inapplicable to deportation proceed-
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contempt petition would have been a viable option.
A petition to a federal district court for a contempt order may have
seemed cumbersome to the INS attorneys and would have required coor-
dination with the local United States Attorney. In the long run it might
have been more efficient. At that proceeding, a determination would
have been made as to the propriety of compelling the respondent to tes-
tify. In district court, while the respondent would not be afforded all of
the procedural safeguards that are built into criminal contempt hearings,
she would at least be entitled to the same due process rights as a civil
litigant in any judicial proceeding. 36 Fundamentally, this would entitle
the respondent to an opportunity for a full, impartial hearing before a
district court judge with proper notice and an opportunity to present all
defenses for her refusal to testify. 
37
The determination whether a complaining party has satisfied its bur-
den of persuasion in civil contempt proceedings is made by a judge sitting
in equity. 3" As such, it is appropriate in light of the defendant's due
process rights for a court to consider other factors which may justify
withholding or mitigating the exercise of its contempt power.
Would a district court judge have ordered the Suffolk Downs respon-
dents to testify? This is a difficult question to answer in general terms,
but the outlines of the debate are clear. From the government's perspec-
tive, section 242(b) authorizes the interrogation of the respondent. Such
authorization would be meaningless without a coercive option. 139 Fur-
ther, the government believes it has the power to subpoena the respon-
dent anyway. If respondent is a citizen or not deportable she can simply
say so and go home. From the respondent's perspective, however, Con-
ings on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Whether the government's reading of Lopez-Men-
doza (as authorizing the Suffolk Downs tactic) is correct is considered infra in Part III.
136. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers v. Bangor & Aroostook Rail-
way Co., 380 F.2d 570, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
137. Id. at 581. See also Mascolo, Procedural Due Process and the Reasonable Doubt Stan-
dard of Proof in Civil Contempt Proceedings, 14 NEW ENG. J. OF CIv. AND CRIM. CONFINE-
MENT 245, 256-58 (1988), which states:
The party moving for a citation of contempt makes out a prima facie case upon
establishing 1) the existence of a legal duty or obligation on the part of the alleged
contemnor, or of a valid court order; and 2) the failure to discharge such duty or obli-
gation, or to comply with the aforesaid order. The burden of persuasion then shifts to
the defendant to show... a present inability to so discharge or comply, without fault on
his part, or to establish mitigating circumstances justifying a court to withhold exercise of
its contempt power.... If.. .the defendant discharges this burden of proof, then the
complaining party must satisfy his burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue for a
finding of contempt. (Emphasis added).
138. See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Amalgamated Transit
Union, 531 F.2d 617, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42,
64 (1924) (18 U.S.C. section 3692 does not grant the contemnor in civil proceedings the right
to trial by jury as this would "set aside the settled rule that a suit in equity is to be tried...
without a jury.").
139. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 443 ("It]he power of the government
to compel persons to testify ... is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence").
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gress has allocated the burden of proof to the government for good policy
reasons. That allocation is meaningless if the government can simply
prove its case through her testimony. Further, on equitable grounds, the
federal courts should not facilitate unconstitutional police practices by
ordering the respondent to testify."4 Especially in such a setting, the
lack of a clear statutory mandate should, per Minker, benefit the
respondent. 4 '
In light of the numerous procedural and jurisdictional problems en-
countered by the INS in the Fifth Circuit,' 4 2 it is perhaps not surprising
that an attempt was made to bypass the district court in Boston. Because
of that tactical decision, the evidentiary value of silence must now be
addressed.
III. THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF SILENCE IN
DEPORTATION HEARINGS
A. The Adverse Inference
Our first, most basic question is whether the drawing of an adverse
inference from silence is ever permissible by an immigration judge.
The answer to this appears to be a qualified "yes." If the calling of the
respondent as a witness is not itself impermissible (as a "functional" sub-
poena), and if the respondent has no fifth amendment'4 3 privilege be-
cause of a valid grant of immunity, then respondent's silence may have
legal consequences. When a witness who has taken the stand in a civil
case refuses to answer a question, the traditional result, of course, is an
order to do so, under a threat of contempt. It is also not uncommon for a
fact finder to draw adverse inferences from silence, or, in the discovery
context, for a matter to be deemed admitted.
Neither the INA nor regulations expressly authorize an immigration
judge to draw an adverse inference from the failure of a respondent to
testify. The closest statutory analogy is the procedure for hearings in
absentia. If the respondent in deportation proceedings does not show up
for his hearing, section 242(b) of the INA authorizes the immigration
140. Ironically, if the federal courts overturn the deportation orders, the government may
face another problem. If the respondents make a prima facie showing that the written state-
ments and, possibly, documentary evidence were taken in an unconstitutional manner, the
burden will shift to the government to show why the evidence should be admitted. If this
cannot be done, the government will have to come up with untainted evidence. But, given the
years it may take to process appeals through the normal course, such evidence may be hard to
find. Further, and most ironically, the passage of time in deportation cases invariably benefits
the respondents, potentially creating eligibility for various forms of relief from deportation.
For example, suspension of deportation under section 244 or section 212(c) relief. Thus, the
Suffolk Downs tactic, while perhaps important as a test case, was not without risk for the
government.
141. These issues are discussed infra in Part IV.
142. See supra Part I.
143. The self-incrimination clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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judge to conduct the hearing in absentia under certain circumstances.'"
The authority to proceed in absentia might be taken as congressional
approval of the Suffolk Downs procedure, since silence on the stand is
perhaps even more probative than the failure to appear at all. If an immi-
gration judge can find deportability without the respondent present, why
not do so based on the silence of the respondent? The answer lies in how
an immigration judge may "proceed" in the absence of the respondent.
Hearings in absentia must proceed "in a like manner as if the alien were
present."' 45 This language would be meaningless if the judge could sim-
ply deem lack of attendance per se to be the government's prima facie
case. Congress was aware that the unusual authorization of in absentia
proceedings was "an extraordinary, punitive measure,"'" and must be
presumed to have included the above language intentionally. Immigra-
tion judges are advised to accept "extrinsic evidence" of deportability
from the INS attorney in cases that proceed in absentia. 47 No reported
cases involve a determination made in absentia without other evidence of
deportability.'"I
Thus, the in absentia procedure does not support the drawing of a con-
clusive adverse inference from the respondent's refusal to testify. But it
is not unusual for adverse inferences to be drawn from silence in deporta-
tion cases. A line of cases stretching back at least seventy years has rec-
ognized the propriety of this practice.' 49 In fact, as noted above, some
courts have even gone so far as to permit an adverse inference to be
drawn from privileged silence.'50
The problem with the government's approach in the Suffolk Downs
cases stems from a basic misconception about silence as evidence and
inferences. An inference may traditionally be drawn when witnesses re-
fuse to testify "in response to probative evidence offered against them."'
But no evidence was offered in these cases.
144. INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1242(g):
If any alien has been given a reasonable opportunity to be present at a proceeding under
this section, and without reasonable cause fails or refuses to attend or remain in attend-
ance at such proceeding, the special inquiry officer may proceed to determination in a
like manner as if the alien were present.
Since the statute requires both "reasonable opportunity" and failure to attend "without rea-
sonable cause," an admission theory based upon the failure to respond to the allegations con-
tained in the OSC is analogous to the Suffolk Downs procedure. See infra Part III.
145. INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1242(g).
146. See Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, J., dissent-
ing). See also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 1653 1712-1713.
147. See Benchbook III, F.
148. See, e.g., Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 331 (prior concession of deportability); Mat-
ter of Patel, Int. Dec. 2993 (BIA 1985) (Service documents on record).
149. See, e.g., cases cited infra, at n.174.
150. See, e.g., Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d at 957.
151. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318.
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Silence in the face of an accusation may, under certain circumstances,
be deemed an admission. 5 2 Here, the accusation, in effect, becomes evi-
dence. A related concept is the evidentiary value of failure to respond
where one has a "duty to do so." Not really a pure evidentiary concept,
the value of silence in this setting depends upon procedural rules,'5 3 and
statutory allocations of burden of proof. Implicit in this "duty" theory is
a justification for silence as evidence based not so much on pursuit of
truth as on vindication of the honor of the process. That is, where a
witness willfully refuses to participate in a legal proceeding, one sanction
may be an order that certain matters be deemed admitted or proven.' 54
The Suffolk Downs procedure relies on a mixture of these silence theo-
ries. The OSC is considered an accusation to which the respondent must
respond. The duty to speak arguably derives from the process itself,
from the fact of being called as a witness and, perhaps, from being given
immunity. The lack of contempt power arguably leaves the immigration
judge with no viable alternative to maintain the dignity of the process.
But do these general principles work in the deportation setting? The
answer to this question depends on who has the burden of production
and proof and whether an inference can satisfy those burdens.
B. The Burden of Production
Subject only to broad constitutional constraints, Congress has plenary
power to establish the burden and standards of proof for deportation
cases. 155 The current expression of this power provides, inter alia, that,
in any deportation proceeding... against any person, the burden of
proof shall be upon such person to show the time, place, and man-
ner of his entry into the United States ... "'
Though there has been some debate as to the class of cases in which
this presumption should operate, 57 courts have, without exception, con-
152. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1071 (1972). See
also Baxter, 425 U.S. at 319.
153. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2), (b)(l)(2).
154. Id. But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern deportation proceedings.
In effect, the Suffolk Downs procedure blurs the distinction between admissions by a party at
trial, which are generally not conclusive of the fact admitted, and so-called "judicial admis-
sions," which are. See, e.g., American Tile Ins. Co. v. Caselaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1988).
155. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 276. See also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d. Sess., re-
printed in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1654.
156. INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
157. Clearly, section 291 does not operate in cases which turn solely on post-entry con-
duct. See, e.g., Iran v. INS, 656 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the section 291 pre-
sumption only applies to cases involving illegal entry); cf In re Benitez, Int. Dec. 2979 (BIA
1984) (presumption applies to any charge of deportability which draws into question the time,
place or manner of alien's entry into the United States.). See generally Watkins, The Ninth
Circuit Versus The Board of Immigration Appeals: Conflicts Over Burden of Proof On Section
291 Deportation - Burden, Burden, Who's Got The Burden, 1 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 5 (1985).
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strued it to apply only after the government has established a prima facie
case of alienage. 58 The legislative history of section 291 supports this
interpretation of the statute, and illuminates the intent of Congress as to
the more general question of the value of silence.
The McCarran-Walter Act codified and amended a patchwork of ex-
isting immigration law.'5 9 Although the Act extensively revised certain
sections of existing law, section 291, in large part, parallels the language
contained in section 23 of the Immigration Act of 1924.1"° Unfortu-
nately, the 328 page House Committee Report on the Walter Immigra-
tion Bill compared this bill with the then existing law, section by section,
but made no mention of any substantive changes made by section 291.
Thus, the legislative history of section 23 of the Immigration Act of 1924
is probably the best source for an analysis of the legislative intent behind
section 291.
In 1924, the newly enacted burden of proof clause was heralded as a
significant new element in United States immigration law.'' The com-
mittee draft of this section provided that: "[I]n any proceeding under the
immigration laws the burden of proving the right of any alien to enter or
remain in the United States shall, as between him and the United States,
be upon such alien."' 6 2  Significantly, in committee, the word "alien"
had been substituted for the word "individual" in this section, from
which one can infer that the initial burden of proving alienage rested
with the government." 3 This conclusion is supported by statements on
the floor of the House in debate over the enactment of section 23. In the
debate, Congressman John Raker, a member of the Committee on Immi-
158. See, e.g., Corona-Palomera v. INS, 661 F.2d 814, 816 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981). See also
Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir. 1977) (government must establish aprima
facie case of both alienage and deportability before section 291 presumption arises). Whether
the immigration judge or the INS attorney may interrogate a respondent who has not yet been
proven an "alien" is an interesting analogous issue. Section 242(b) restricts the interrogation
power to "the alien or witness." Conversely, section 2 35(a) refers to "any person" and "any
alien or person he believes or suspects to be an alien."
159. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1677-78.
160. All aliens coming to the United States shall be required to state under oath the
purposes for which they came; the length of time they intend to remain in the United
States; whether or. not they intend to abide in the United States permanently and be-
come citizens thereof, and such other items of information regarding themselves as will
aid the immigration officials in determining whether they belong to any of the excluded
classes enumerated in section three hereof.
Section 16 of the Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 (it does not cover deportation
proceedings).
161. E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798
- 1965 189 (1981).
162. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, ch. 190, § 23, 43 Stat. 153, 165-66; see
supra notes 152-53.




gration and Naturalization, was asked what the consequences would be if
an alien were to refuse to testify at his deportation hearing:
Mr. Miller of Washington: I wish to ask this question: A man
smuggles himself across the frontier. He is accused of being unlaw-
fully in the United States. He folds his arms and remains silent.
Mr. Raker: Yes, the gentleman from Washington is right. There
are two provisions in section 23. There is no one who claims that
the burden of proof is [sic] on the man who seeks the right to enter
the United States. That is unquestioned. The second provision con-
cerns those who are in the United States when proceedings are
sought to deport them .... You start a proceeding for deportation,
and the United States must prove under this act and under the law
he is an alien. Then this court says here, "The man shall not stand
mute, but you can compel him to testify. Under this provision he
would have to testify." ''
The version of section 23 that Congress enacted into law retained the
burden on the government to prove alienage. The enacted law, however,
differed from the committee draft in that the subsequent burden on the
alien (she is proven to be an alien) was lessened. Rather than requiring
an alien to prove her right to remain in the United States, section 23, as
enacted, required only that the alien must show the "time, place, and
manner" of lawful entry into the United States.16 The floor debate in
the House over the enactment of section 23 indicates that Congress chose
to limit the alien's burden of proof out of fear that compelling an alien to
testify would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the fifth amendment.
The sponsor of the final version of section 23 argued, in fact, that requir-
ing aliens to prove their right to remain in the United States "is contrary
to the practice and the basic principles of the United States guaranteeing
everybody, when accused of any crime, the right of a supposition of inno-
cence until they are proven guilty."'" Opponents of the ultimate version
of section 23, which lessened the alien's burden of proof, argued that
immigration proceedings were civil proceedings and that imposition of a
complete burden of proof on the alien was clearly constitutional. 167 But
they lost the argument. Thus, the House debates indicate that the Con-
gress chose to place the burden of proving alienage on the government,
and to restrict the alien's burden based on policy concerns rooted in prin-
ciples of criminal justice, though applied to a "civil" proceeding.
The modern burden of proof clause in section 291 of the INA retains
164. 65 CONG. REc. 6256 (1924). Presumably, Mr. Raker meant to say that no one claims
the burden is not on the initial entrant.
165. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, ch. 190, § 23, 43 Stat. 153, 165-66.
166. 65 CONG. REC. 6252. It is, of course, striking how the civil nature of deportation
proceedings, formalistically, changes this argument; though its underlying spirit might still be
valid under the due process clause.
167. 65 CONG. REC. 6255.
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the language of the 1924 Act limiting the alien's burden to a showing of
the "time, place, and manner of entry into the United States."' I 6 ' The
drafters of section 291, however, substituted the word "person" for the
word "alien" in revising the burden of proof clause. Thus, where the
1924 Act establishes the burden of proof "in any deportation proceeding
against any alien," the current law applies "in any deportation proceed-
ing ...against any person."' 169 Arguably, this revision of the statute
might eliminate the government's burden of proving alienage in deporta-
tion proceedings. Since the 1924 change in the statutory language from
"individual" to "alien" imposed an additional burden on the govern-
ment, the 1952 change from "alien" to "person" might logically be seen
as removing that burden. This argument, however, is not persuasive, and
courts have not accepted it. The 1924 burden of proof clause was new
legislation. The section was debated and amended in committee and on
the floor of the house. In the years after the enactment, the idea that the
government bore the burden of proving alienage became settled law. 7 '
In this context, the change of one word in the 1952 Act is a rather ob-
lique way of attempting to change thirty years of immigration practice.
If Congress intended that the 1952 Act should alter the burden of proof
in deportation proceedings, it is likely that it would have done so overtly
and that the legislative history would bear evidence of this changed in-
tent. As noted, there is no such evidence, and all court and commenta-
tors have recognized the government's burden to prove alienage in
section 291 cases.' 7 ' Another, more specific reason for this conclusion is
that, although section 291 refers to any "person," its effect is limited to
deportation proceedings under chapter 5 of the INA. That chapter per-
tains only to "any alien in the United States."' 72
Section 291 only covers the issues of "time, place, and manner" of
entry. A wide range of deportation cases may arise which in no way
involve these matters." 3 In these cases, the burden of proof has not been
specifically mandated by statute.'74 The Supreme Court, however, has
held that, absent statutory prescription, the burden as to each element is
on the government. 175 Thus, the final question is whether, in section 291
cases, silence can prove alienage, triggering the burden shift; and
168. INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
169. Id.
170. See W. VAN VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS 206 (1932).
171. See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 12, at 7.
172. INA § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
173. See, e.g., INA § 241(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1988) (institutionalization at public
expense); § 241(a)(4), § 1251 (crimes committed); and § 241(a)(6), § 1251(a)(3) (anarchists,
communists, etc,).
174. Section 242(b)(4) of the INA, however, requires that deportation findings be sup-
ported by "reasonable, substantial and probative" evidence. The government must state a
precise ground of deportability in the Order to Show Cause. INA § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4) (1988).
175. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 282-86.
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whether, in other cases, silence can prove every element of the govern-
ment's case. As there is no substantive difference to the alien or the
United States between section 291 and other cases, the evidentiary analy-
sis should be the same.
C. The Quantum of Proof
For nearly a quarter century, the Supreme Court has required that "no
deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence that the fact alleged as grounds for deportation
are true."" 6 Though the reasoning of Woodby is somewhat elusive, it is
primarily based upon the recognition of the functional similarity between
deportation and denaturalization,"' and upon the lack of explicit Con-
gressional guidance as to the quantum of proof required to prove de-
portability. It has now become a solid fixture in the immigration law of
the United States, and works well in practice.
In the twenty-four years since Woodby was decided, the BIA and the
courts have often evaluated evidence of alienage presented by the INS to
determine if it meets the Woodby standard. It has, for example, been held
that ambiguous statements regarding alienage are insufficient to meet the
INS's burden. 79 Evidence that relates to the respondent's alienage sta-
tus four years before a deportation hearing has been held to fall short of
the Woodby standard.'8 Given the strictness with which the standard
has been applied, it is hardly surprising that neither the BIA nor any
court has ever held that an adverse inference drawn from silence, absent
more, could constitute the requisite clear, unequivocal and convincing
evidence of alienage.
The question of the value of silence as evidence has arisen frequently in
deportation cases since Woodby. But, without exception, cases which
have affirmed deportation orders based on silence or inference have in-
cluded other testimonial or documentary evidence.' 81 Even before
Woodby, the virtually unanimous opinion of all courts and commentators
was that more than silence was required to prove deportability. 82
176. L at 286.
177. The Woodby standard was derived from Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118
(1943) (denaturalization issue).
178. See also 8 C.F.R. § 243.14(a) (1990) (adopting the Woodby standard).
179. Paointhara v. INS, 721 F.2d 651, 652 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'g and mod(fying, 708 F.2d
472 (9th Cir. 1983).
180. Sint v. INS, 500 F.2d 120, 122 (1st Cir. 1974).
181. See, e.g., Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d at 959 (1-123 containing statement of alienage
admitted into evidence); Matter of Li, 15 I. & N. Dec. 514 (BIA 1975) (respondent who re-
fused to testify found deportable based on evidence in the INS's possession prior to his arrest);
Matter of Cheung, 13 1. & N. Dec. 794 (BIA 1971); Matter of Tang, 674 F. Supp. 1058 (1987).
182. See, e.g., United States ex rel Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) (transcript of
prehearing interrogation of alien and literature admitted); Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232
F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1956) (appellant's silence plus his sworn statement sufficient to prove prior
deportation); Matter of J-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 568, 572 (BIA 1960) (where no primafacie case of
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Courts in immigration cases have consistently accorded little weight to
silence as evidence. In Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy,"8 3 the INS sought
to deport the respondent on the grounds that he had "meaningfully asso-
ciated" with the Communist Party.8 4 The government presented the
testimony of witnesses and argued that, combined with the respondent's
silence, this was enough to prove deportability. The response of the
Supreme Court was as follows:
As against the slimness of the evidence that it introduced, the
Government seeks the benefit of an inference based upon petitioner's
failure to produce or elicit evidence... that his association with the
party was 'more than the mere voluntary listing of... [his] name on
Party rolls'... . It is a sufficient answer to the Government's argu-
ment to point out that ... deportation is a drastic sanction, one
which can destroy lives and disrupt families, and that a holding of
deportability must therefore be premised upon evidence of 'mean-
ingful association' more directly probative than a mere inference
based upon the alien's silence.1 5
Similarly, in Navia-Duran, the court was faced with a situation where
all evidence other than the respondent's silence was suppressed. At the
deportation hearing, the respondent remained silent upon advice of coun-
sel and called upon the government to prove its case. 18 6 The government
then introduced, over objection, an INS form containing admissions ap-
parently signed by the respondent. The respondent refused to identify
her signature and no additional witnesses were called by the Service.' 87
After analyzing the facts surrounding the attainment of the INS state-
ment, the court found that it had been coerced and was therefore inad-
missible.' Although the record before it contained the respondent's
silence, the court held that:
given the inadmissibility of the signed statement, the INS is left with
deportability is established, "[s]uspicion can not be solidified into proof by the mere silence of
the respondent"); Matter of P-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 133 (BIA 1956) (respondent's silence plus his
previous sworn statement established alienage and deportability); Matter of 0-, 6 I. & N.
Dec. 246 (BIA 1954) (respondent's silence plus prima facie case of deportability based on other
evidence meets the government's burden of establishing deportability by reasonable, substan-
tial and probative evidence); Matter of K-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 175, 178 (BIA 1953) (adverse
inference may be drawn from respondent's failure to testify without legal justification where
"respondent remained mute as to facts well within his knowledge after evidence which called
for rebuttal had been introduced").
183. 374 U.S. 469 (1963).
184. Id at 471; see INA § 241(a)(6)(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(c) (1988).
185. Id at 479. See also U.S. ex reL Kettunen v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1935)
(silence accorded "no more than a scintilla" of evidentiary force, and held insufficient to sup-
port deportation). It is important to bear in mind that Gastelum-Quinones preceded Woodby.
Thus, the standard of proof was something less than "clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence."
186. Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d at 806.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 810.
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no evidence to support the deportation order, much less 'clear and
unequivocal and convincing evidence' as required by 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.14(a) or 'reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence' as
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1970) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)
(1970).189
In Navia-Duran, the court found that a record which contained only
the respondent's silence "leaves [a] deportation order totally
unsupported." 191
The INS argument in favor of silence as evidence in deportation de-
rives from United States ex rel Bilokumsky v. Tod. 9' Though this case
contains some particularly virulent language, its facts are critical.
Bilokumsky was charged with having in his possession printed matter
which advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Prior to the
application for a warrant for arrest for deportation, Bilokumsky had
been confined in prison. While there, he was interrogated by an immi-
gration inspector. The transcript of this interrogation was admitted at
the hearing because, although Bilokumsky was called as a witness, he
stood mute. Evidence as to the literature was admitted without objec-
tion. The critical missing element in the government's case was proof of
alienage. 192
The court stated that an adverse inference as to alienage could be
drawn from Bilokumsky's silence.
Conduct which forms a basis for inference is evidence. Silence is
often evidence of the most persuasive character ... there is no rule
of law which prohibits officers charged with the administration of
the immigration law from drawing an inference from the silence of
one who is called upon to speak.193
But this frequently quoted statement means less than it seems. First,
Bilokumsky preceded Woodby by more than four decades. The standard
of proof in 1923 was not clear, unequivocal, and convincing. As the First
Circuit recognized in Sint,
to the extent that Bilokumsky... could be read to place the burden
of going forward on a defendant in a deportation proceeding, it may
be inapposite now that the government must sustain a clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing burden of proof. 94
As noted above, there is not a single post-Woodby case where silence
189. Id at 811.
190. Id See also In re Francois, BIA File No. A-24-705-526 (unpublished decision).
191. 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
192. Id. at 153.
193. Id at 153-54.
194. Sint, 500 F.2d at 123 n. 1. See also Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d at 809-10 (Bilokumsky has
been undercut by later cases).
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alone has sustained an order of deportability. 19 Second, the language in
Bilokumsky as to value of an adverse inference was dicta. As the court
expressly held that Bilokumsky's interrogation was not tainted nor im-
proper and that the statement was therefore sufficient evidence for de-
portability, the issue of the proper interpretation to be placed on his
silence was, in effect, irrelevant. 96
In light of the above, can the INS now argue that silence can prove
deportability? If so, the reason must lie between the lines of Justice
O'Connor's decision in Lopez-Mendoza, which seemed to resurrect
Bilokumsky and, perhaps, to increase the evidentiary value of the infer-
ence from silence.'97 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor stated
that, in many deportation cases, "the sole matters necessary for the Gov-
ernment to establish are the respondent's identity and alienage at which
point the burden shifts . .. 19 The Court stated that the government's
burden is eased by the availability of the Bilokumsky inference "[t]he
INS's task is simplified ... by the civil nature of the proceeding. As
Justice Brandeis stated: 'Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive
character . *...' "199
Was this favorable review of Bilokumsky a hint that silence can now
prove deportability? If so, it is a heavily veiled one. The issue in Lopez-
Mendoza was whether the exclusionary rule should bar illegally seized
evidence in deportation proceedings. The opinion is primarily a "cost-
benefit" analysis of this issue. If the Court had intended to approve of
the proof of deportability by silence why would it specifically note that
proof of alienage is possible with independent or attenuated evidence? If
alienage and deportability can be proven solely by inference, then why
would the INS ever begin its case by seeking to introduce evidence other
than the respondent's testimony? Clearly, the better trial practice would
be to save such evidence for impeachment or clarification. Further, the
Court recognized the importance of the section 291 burden shift to the
presentation of the government's case.2° But, as noted above, that bur-
den shift is meaningless if the Bilokumsky inference meets the Woodby
test. In fact, if Lopez-Mendoza means that deportability can be proven
through the respondent's testimony or silence, the entire opinion be-
comes largely irrelevant. The exclusionary rule need never be invoked,
as the entire case can be proven from the mouth of the arrestee.
A much more prudent reading of Lopez-Mendoza maintains the rule of
Woodby and Gastelum-Quinones. An adverse inference may buttress the
195. See supra note 173.
196. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 155.
197. See Watkins, supra note 12, at 1078.
198. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043.
199. Id
200. Id. at 1038-39.
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government's case; it simplifies the task for the INS in conjunction with
other evidence. For this reason, according to the Court, the benefit of the
exclusionary rule is less in this setting than in criminal matters. 20 1 There
is simply no reason to take Justice O'Connor's resurrection of Bilokum-
sky as more than what it purports to be, an argument that existing prac-
tice supported her position on the exclusionary rule.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH THE USE
OF THE RESPONDENT AS WITNESS AND OF SILENCE AS
EVIDENCE
Even if the INA permits the government to call the respondent to
prove its case, to grant immunity, and, if the respondent stands mute, to
have the immigration judge infer alienage and deportability, the constitu-
tional and public policy aspects of these procedures must still be
considered.
A. The Problem of Involuntary Testimony
The most basic question is whether the government, with or without
immunity being granted, can call the respondent to testify against her
interest. As noted in Part I, the self incrimination clause has not been
held to protect against deportation per se. However, as Professor Tribe
and others have noted, "there is at least some room to question whether
the doctrine that deportation is not criminal punishment is valid.
2 2
The argument in favor of extending the privilege to deportation involves
a functional analysis of this "civil" procedure. Such an approach to the
fifth amendment is not unprecedented.2 "3 But, though courts have often
been willing to recognize deportation as a penalty, no court has yet been
willing to extend the functional analysis this far.2 ' 4
Because of the persistence of the civil/criminal distinction in deporta-
tion cases, the issue of involuntariness in deportation cases is better ana-
lyzed as one of due process. There is no question that aliens in
deportation proceedings are entitled to due process, and the touchstone
201. But see id. at 1053-54 (White, J., dissenting) ("[t]he majority attempts to justify the
distinction by asserting that deportation will still be possible when evidence not derived from
the illegal search or seizure is independently sufficient .... However, that is no less true in
criminal cases...").
202. See Hays, supra note 2.
203. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) ("[a]nd our Constitution guarantees that
no person shall be 'compelled' to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with
deprivation of liberty - a command which this Court has broadly applied and generously
implemented in accordance with the teaching of the history of the privilege and its great office
in mankind's battle for freedom.. ."; see also United States v. U.S. Coin and Currency, 401
U.S. 715 (1971) (forfeiture proceedings); Gonzalez v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp 460 (C.D. Cal.
1977) (school disciplinary proceedings).
204. But see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1949) ("[a] deportation hear-
ing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands
to which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself").
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in this setting is "fundamental fairness. 2 °5
The BIA, and many courts, have frequently stated that, "the use of an
admission obtained from a respondent involuntarily is fundamentally un-
fair." 2' This concern, of course, in large part sustains the modern view
of the scope of the self-incrimination privilege, as well: That courts must
exercise special care where the state seeks evidence from a defendant by
"the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth."2 7
Given the substantial questions as to whether the statute and regula-
tions even permit the respondent to be called as a witness, let alone to be
forced to testify, and the general consensus among courts, commentators
and even the Department of Justice20 8 that the fundamental unfairness of
involuntary statements outweighs their expediency, the Suffolk Downs
procedure should be held to violate the respondent's right to due process.
Even if a court were to hold that the respondent's involuntary testi-
mony could be used, there remain further constitutional problems with
the Suffolk Downs adverse inference procedure. Are additional proce-
dural protections required? The court will balance,
[flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.2°"
Despite certain inherent difficulties with the Matthews test in the im-
migration context, 2 0 there is no doubt that the private interest, the lib-
erty to live in the United States, is substantial. The risk of an erroneous
deprivation through the use of an adverse inference is high. As noted
above, courts have consistently deprecated the evidentiary value of si-
lence in the immigration context.2"' There is considerable ambiguity in-
205. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (commonly referred to as the Japanese
Immigrant Case). See also Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) ("[e]ven one whose
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary or transitory is entitled to that Constitutional
protection").
206. Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 1980). See also Bong Youn
Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1960) ("[elxpulsion cannot turn upon utterances
cudgeled from the alien by government authorities"); Matter of Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec.
325 (BIA 1980).
207. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)).
208. The INS accepts that it cannot use involuntary statements: "The alien shall also be
advised that any statement made may be used against him/her in a subsequent proceeding
.... 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1990). The implication of this warning must be that the respondent
has the right not to make such statements.
209. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
210. See Kanstroom, Judicial Review of Amnesty Denials: Must Aliens Bet Their Lives to
Get into Court, 25 HARV. CIv. Rrs./Civ. LIB. L. REv. 53, 90 (1990).
211. The ambiguity of inferences from silence has been noted in criminal cases. See, e.g.,
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herent even in the voluntary statements of a respondent. As the
Benchbook counsels:
If all OSC factual allegations are admitted and the charge is con-
ceded... if the respondent is an immigrant, it is a good practice to
call upon INS counsel to present some extrinsic evidence on
deportability.2
12
Conversely, the value of additional or substitute safeguards is obvious.
An order to testify by a district court judge, under threat of contempt,
would guarantee both a full review of the propriety of INS conduct in a
particular case, and, if successful, specific, detailed testimony upon which
a decision could reasonably be based. Concededly, the Suffolk Downs
procedure is faster. That was its basic appeal from the start. But, in
light of the substantial liberty interest, the high risk of error, and the
availability of alternative procedures that have worked without great dif-
ficulty in immigration cases for nearly a century, the speed criterion
should not be the determining factor.
The inference from silence also implicates "fundamental fairness," and
raises the question whether the Woodby standard is constitutionally re-
quired.2" 3 The Supreme Court has sent conflicting signals 214 but seems
consistently to recognize that where the stakes are high, and the state is a
party, a higher standard than a mere preponderance is required. In Ri-
vera v. Minnich,2' 5 for example, which involved the standard of proof in
paternity cases, Justice Stevens distinguished Santosky v. Kramer,216 a
termination of parental rights case,
the contestants in a termination proceeding are the State and an in-
dividual. Because the State has superior resources and because an
adverse ruling in a criminal, civil commitment, or termination pro-
ceeding has especially severe consequences for the individuals af-
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Phelps v. Duckworth, 757 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1985),
vacated on reh'g, 772 F.2d 1410 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1011 (1986) (rule that criminal
defendant may not be cross examined on post-arrest silence is not only to protect the right to
remain silent, but to prohibit prosecutor from making issue of insolubly ambiguous silence).
212. Benchbook III B(6)(a). As noted above, despite a rather lengthy discussion of the
problems that may arise when a respondent stands mute, the Benchbook never suggests draw-
ing an adverse inference from silence.
213. This question would only arise in practice if Congress amended the INA. A "Suffolk
Downs" statute would, if drafted most efficiently, simply shift the burden of both production
and persuasion in all deportation cases onto the respondent. A second, more complex, possi-
bility would be to affirm, explicitly, the calling of the respondent as a witness and to accept the
adverse inference as sufficient evidence. In either case, changes to both the allocation of the
burden and the quantum of proof must be considered.
214. Compare Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) (intimating that Woodby was not
constitutionally required) with Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (where the
Court, without citing Terrazas, held that an intermediate standard of proof was necessary in
cases such as civil commitment, deportation, and denaturalization, "to preserve fundamental
fairness...").
215. 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
216. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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fected, it is appropriate for society to impose upon itself a
disproportionate share of the risk of error in such proceedings.217
Thus, while it is not clear that the Woodby standard is per se constitu-
tionally required, the issue of the standard of proof in deportation pro-
ceedings certainly evokes constitutional scrutiny. As silence was
generally held insufficient evidence of deportability even before Woodby,
its acceptance as conclusive evidence now would be hard to square with
any modem notion of fundamental fairness. To paraphrase Justice For-
tas, under our Constitution, the condition of being arrested by the immi-
gration service does not justify a kangaroo court.218
Finally, on a broader, policy level, the acceptance of this procedure
would be a mistake. It would eliminate all incentive for the INS to com-
ply with the fourth and fifth amendments. Even the residual protections
allowed by Lopez-Mendoza would evaporate. It must be recalled that
Justice O'Connor, to a large extent, based her decision on the existence of
INS safeguards against such violations.2"9 The Court also stated:
We do not condone any violations of the fourth amendment that
may have occurred... our conclusions concerning the exclusionary
rule's value might change, if there developed good reason to believe
the fourth amendment violations by INS were widespread .... Fi-
nally, we do not deal here with egregious violations of fourth
amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of funda-
mental fairness and undermine the probative value for the evidence
obtained.220
The implications of the Suffolk Downs procedure are that a person
may be arrested by INS agents without probable cause, may be severely
mistreated during and after the arrest, and will then have no opportunity
to obtain judicial review of such conduct. The public will be forced to
rely completely on the will and ability of the INS to comply with the
fourth amendment, though, as Justice White pointed out in dissent in
Lopez-Mendoza, he could not "find" a single instance in which INS's
procedures for doing so had been invoked.22" ' In sum, if the Suffolk
Downs procedure is upheld, the INS will be more likely to arrest anyone
it chooses and less likely to comply with the constitution, a scenario that
should concern not only aliens, but anyone who might look or sound like
an alien to an INS officer.
217. Rivera, 483 U.S. at 581 (citations omitted).
218. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) ("[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a
boy does not justify a kangaroo court").
219. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044 ("perhaps most important, the INS has its own
comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its officers... INS has
developed rules restricting stop, interrogation, and arrest practices...") (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 1050-51.
221. Id at 1054 (White, J., dissenting). The civil suit remedy is extremely unrealistic for




The Suffolk Downs procedure has been heralded as a way to "stream-
line" deportation proceedings.222 This, it would undoubtedly do, but the
costs are too high. While its basic efficiency cannot be denied, the com-
pulsion of testimony from a respondent is unauthorized by the INA and
fundamentally unfair. It would remove virtually all INS enforcement
actions from judicial review, thereby undercutting any remaining protec-
tions against egregious or widespread constitutional violations by the
agency. More specifically, even if the respondent can be called as a wit-
ness, the drawing of a conclusive adverse inference is unwarranted and
unwise. It constitutes the sacrifice of procedural fairness on the altar of
efficiency.
The temptation to achieve efficiency at the expense of procedural pro-
tections is always strong. But, in the deportation context, as Judge Levin
Campbell put it, "[w]e should not encourage the cutting of corners by an
agency having such significant responsibilities." '223 The INS should
strive, as most immigration judges have, to remain in the procedural
mainstream. In the long run, because it is supported by our best and
most durable legal traditions, this will be the truly efficient strategy.
ADDENDUM
As this article was on its way to the printer, the Board of Immigration
Appeals issued the first substantive ruling in a Suffolk Downs case.224
The case was decided in the unusual posture of interlocutory review,
which is undertaken "to address important jurisdictional questions re-
garding the adminstration of the immigration laws, or to correct recur-
ring problems in the handling of cases by IJs."225 The Board assumed,
without deciding, that the grant of immunity by the Service was valid,
and that respondent's silence was unprivileged.226 The essential question
was found to be:
[W]hether the respondent's silence in the face of questioning by Ser-
vice counsel at the hearing before the immigration judge constituted
enough evidence to shift the burden of proof to the respondent
under section 291 of the Act, such that his continued silence prop-
erly resulted in a finding that his deportability was established by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.227
The Board noted at the outset that adverse inferences may, indeed, be
222. Watkins, supra note 12, at 1099.
223. Sint, 500 F.2d at 124.
224. In re Guevara-Santos, (BIA September, 14, 1990).
225. Id. at 1.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 4.
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drawn from a respondent's silence in deportation hearings. 228 But this
proposition was deemed not to control the situation at the start of a hear-
ing, prior to the introduction of evidence by the government. 229 Cor-
rectly noting that Bilokumsky had involved other evidence besides
silence, the Board framed the issue in procedural terms:
The legal concept of a 'burden of proof' requires that the party upon
whom the burden rests carry such burden by presenting evidence. If
the only evidence necessary to satisfy this burden were the silence of
the other party, then for all practical purposes, the burden would
actually fall upon the silent party from the outset .... We cannot
rewrite the Act [the INA] to reflect such a shift in the burden of
proof.2
30
Finding that no further evidence was likely to be presented on the de-
portability issue (because the Service had rested and the judge had con-
+;-.,,,A *1. ,- ,-,,h, 1- f~r.,ea ,ff prA-r cir rAl;pf frnm ,A-nrtatmnn)
